\u3cem\u3eO\u27Keeffe v. Ireland\u3c/em\u3e: The State\u27s Obligation to Protect Children from Sexual Assault in State Schools by Lee, Heekyoung
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 40
Issue 3 Electronic Supplement Article 3
4-19-2017
O'Keeffe v. Ireland: The State's Obligation to Protect
Children from Sexual Assault in State Schools
Heekyoung Lee
Boston College Law School, heekyoung.lee@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law
Commons, Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Education
Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, Law Enforcement and
Corrections Commons, Religion Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Heekyoung Lee, O'Keeffe v. Ireland: The State's Obligation to Protect Children from Sexual Assault in State Schools, 40 B.C. Int'l & Comp.
L. Rev. E. Supp. 28 (2017),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol40/iss3/3
 
 
28 
O’KEEFFE v. IRELAND: THE STATE’S 
OBLIGATION TO PROTECT CHILDREN 
FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT IN  
STATE SCHOOLS 
HEEKYOUNG LEE* 
Abstract: Ireland’s unique primary education system creates a national school sys-
tem that is denominational, yet state-financed. The Irish government defers mana-
gerial duties to the Catholic Church, and this deference of duties relieves Ireland 
from liability. As a result, students in Ireland attending primary schools historically 
were not guaranteed legal protection from sexual assaults committed by faculty 
members. On January 28, 2014, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights held in O’Keeffe v. Ireland that despite Ireland’s delegation of authority 
to religious denominations, the State was obligated to protect students from sexual 
assaults. The court reasoned that the State had an obligation to guarantee Article 3 
fundamental rights, because no one, especially vulnerable children in primary edu-
cation, should be subject to inhuman treatment. The court also noted that such an 
obligation could not be absolved through the delegation of powers. This Comment 
examines the court’s reasoning and argues that its decision leaves unanswered the 
scope of interpretation in future cases of abuse. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Ireland, upon the enactment of the Commission to Inquire into Child 
Abuse Act in 2000, the Ryan Commission was formed to investigate child 
abuse occurring primarily in reformatory and industrial schools.1 The Ryan 
Commission stated in its 2009 report (the Ryan Report) that Irish schools faced 
a chronic case of physical and sexual abuse of students by clergy from the 
1930s to the 1970s.2 One such student was Louise O’Keeffe, who was subject-
ed to sexual assaults by her school principal, Leo Hickey, in 1973.3 Hickey 
was later charged with 386 counts of sexual abuse involving twenty-one for-
mer students of Dunderrow National School.4 
                                                                                                                           
 * Heekyoung Lee is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
 1 Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse Act 2000 (Act No. 7/2000) (Ir.), http://www.irish
statutebook.ie/eli/2000/act/7/enacted/en/html [https://perma.cc/MZK2-EJHS]; O’Keeffe v. Ireland, 
2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 180. 
 2 O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 180. 
 3 Id. at 165. 
 4 Id. at 166. 
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In O’Keeffe v. Ireland, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECtHR) held that Ireland had violated Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (European Convention) by failing to protect 
O’Keeffe from the sexual assaults.5 In determining whether the State was obli-
gated to protect O’Keeffe and fellow pupils from the sexual assaults, the court 
noted that the events took place in 1973 and stressed that it would assess the 
State’s obligation under the standards of 1973.6 The court held that because 
Article 3 guaranteed fundamental rights, especially to vulnerable children in 
the primary education context, the State was inherently obligated to protect 
children from harsh treatment.7 
Part I of this Comment provides relevant background information on Ire-
land’s primary education system, the facts of O’Keefe v. Ireland, and the pro-
cedural history of the case. Part II discusses the parties’ contentions and the 
ECtHR’s decision. Part III analyzes the court’s judgment and discusses recent 
implications of the decision. It also argues that although the outcome of 
O’Keeffe was correct, the ECtHR’s holding was too broad, leaving many unan-
swered questions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Primary Education in Ireland 
Section 4 of the School Attendance Act of 1926 requires all children in 
Ireland between the ages of six and fourteen to attend school.8 In 1969, the 
education requirement was increased to the age of sixteen.9 In Ireland, most 
primary school-aged children attend state-financed and denominational nation-
al schools.10 The Department of Education and Skills reported in February of 
1973 that ninety-four percent of primary schools were national schools.11 
Moreover, nearly all primary education students attended the state-financed 
and denominational national schools.12 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Id. at 206–07. 
 6 Id. at 191. 
 7 See id. at 192–93. 
 8 School Attendance Act 1926 (Act No. 17/1926), §§ 2, 4 (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/
1926/act/17/enacted/en/html [https://perma.cc/AKR2-7DJN]; see O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 
173. 
 9 See O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 173–74. 
 10 See id. at 174. 
 11 See id. 
 12 Id. The court also found that a large portion of the population attended Catholic-run denomina-
tional schools. See id. The court referenced the 1965 Investment in Education Report, which found 
that 97.6% of Irish students attended Catholic-run national schools, and that Catholic-run schools 
constituted 91% of all national schools. Id. 
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Irish national schools are governed by the 1965 Rules for National 
Schools under the Department of Education (1965 Rules).13 The court in 
O’Keefe noted that the 1965 Rules are legally controlling even though they are 
neither primary nor secondary legislation.14 In accordance with the 1965 
Rules, a manager, clergyman, or other person recognized by the Minister of 
Education (Minister) oversees each national school.15 The school managers are 
responsible for directly governing the schools, appointing teachers, removing 
teachers subject to the approval of the Minister, and visiting their schools to 
ensure that they are complying with the 1965 Rules.16 The Minister and other 
authorized inspectors also have the ability to visit schools to ensure compli-
ance with the 1965 Rules.17 As provided in Rule 161 of the 1965 Rules, in-
spectors serve as agents of the Minister and should inform the Minister of 
managers and teachers that infringe any of the 1965 Rules.18 
B. Sexual Assaults at Dunderrow National School 
 Starting in 1968, Louise O’Keeffe was a student at Dunderrow National 
School.19 Five years later, in 1973, she was subjected to repeated sexual as-
saults by L.H., the school’s principal, .20 In 1971, the parent of another student 
alleged that her child was sexually abused by L.H..21 Although O’Keeffe’s 
parents were unaware of the 1971 allegation, other parents brought to their 
attention similar allegations concerning L.H..22 A meeting of parents chaired 
by the school’s manager, a local parish priest, was held to address the allega-
tions.23 The meeting resulted in L.H. taking sick leave.24 Shortly after, he re-
signed from his position at Dunderrow National School in September 1973.25 
Despite the school’s knowledge of the sexual assaults and multiple visits from 
the school’s assigned manager, the sexual assault allegations were not reported 
to the inspector, police, or any other state authority.26 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Id. at 175; Dep’t of Educ., Rules for National Schools under the Department of Education 
(1965) (Ir.), http://www.scoilultain.ie/wp-content/uploads/docs/rules-for-national-schools-1965.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AK32-EMME] [hereinafter Rules for National Schools]. 
 14 O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 175 (citing Brown v. Board of Mgmt. of Rathfarnham Parish 
Nat’l Sch. [2006] IEHC 178 (Ir.)). 
 15 Rules for National Schools, supra note 13, ¶ 15. 
 16 Id. at 8, intro. 
 17 Id. ¶ 11; see O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 176. 
 18 O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 176; Rules for National Schools, supra note 13, ¶ 161. 
 19 O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 165. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See id. at 165–66. 
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L.H. began teaching at another national school shortly after his resigna-
tion from Dunderrow National School until his retirement in 1995.27 In 1995, 
an investigation was launched after a former student filed a complaint with the 
police.28 At the conclusion of the investigation, L.H. was charged with 386 
counts of sexual abuse involving twenty-one former students of Dunderrow 
National School.29 
C. Procedural History 
O’Keeffe filed a civil complaint to the High Court in September 1998 
against L.H. requesting damages for personal injuries suffered as a conse-
quence of the sexual abuse.30 She also filed a claim against the Minister and 
the State for: (1) negligence by the State for failing to implement measures to 
protect herself and others from the abuse by L.H., (2) vicarious liability of the 
State for L.H.’s actions as an employee of the State, and (3) liability of the 
State due to O’Keeffe’s right to bodily integrity and the State’s duty to provide 
primary education.31 On November 8, 1999, O’Keeffe received a default 
judgment against L.H. due to his failure to assert a defense.32 The High Court 
awarded damages in the amount of €305,104 to O’Keeffe.33  
Regarding the allegations against the State, the defendants applied to 
strike out the case, claiming that O’Keeffe had failed to establish a prima facie 
negligence case against the State.34 The High Court agreed.35 On January 20, 
2006, the High Court held that because Dunderrow was under denominational 
management, vicarious liability did not attach to the State for L.H.’s sexual 
assaults.36 The High Court also noted that there was no breach of a constitu-
tional right where tort law protected the same right.37 O’Keeffe appealed the 
vicarious liability claim to the Supreme Court of Ireland in May 2006.38 She 
argued that the High Court’s March 2004 ruling lacked support and that vicari-
                                                                                                                           
 27 Id. at 166. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 167. In Ireland, the High Court is a court with full jurisdiction in all criminal and civil 
matters established under Article 34 of the Constitution of Ireland. Constitution of Ireland 1937 arts. 
34, 37. 
 31 O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 167. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 168. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. The Supreme Court of Ireland acts as a court of final appeal and has appellate jurisdiction 
from a decision of the High Court when it believes “[t]he decision involves a matter of general public 
importance” or it would in “the interests of justice.” Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 34. 
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ous liability arising out of a manager’s inaction was never addressed by the 
court.39  
On December 19, 2008, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, noting 
that the test for vicarious liability against the State was not met.40 In addition, 
the court held that there could be no finding against the Minister because his 
governing duties were limited strictly to the school’s academics and he there-
fore did not have direct control of L.H..41 Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
noted that the sexual abuse of O’Keeffe was not foreseeable because such acts 
were “unusual act[s], little discussed, and certainly not regarded as an ordinary 
foreseeable risk of attending at a school.”42 
 O’Keeffe appealed to the ECtHR on June 2009, relying on Articles 3,43 
8,44 and 1445 of the European Convention and Article 2 of the Protocol to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(Protocol 1).46 She argued that Ireland had failed its obligation under Article 3, 
Article 8, and Article 2 of Protocol 1 to protect children from sexual abuse.47 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Arguments of the Parties 
O’Keeffe first argued that pursuant to Articles 3, 8, and 14 of the Europe-
an Convention read together with Article 2 of Protocol 1, Ireland had a duty to 
organize its education system to ensure the protection of children, as facilitated 
in Article 42 of the Constitution.48 She claimed that the State failed to provide 
sufficient legal obligations or guidelines to ensure that relevant actors would 
                                                                                                                           
 39 O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 168. 
 40 See id. at 169–71. 
 41 See id. 
 42 Id. at 171 (quoting O’Keeffe v. Hickey [2008] IESC 72 (Ir.)). 
 43 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]. Article 3 of the 
Convention provides in relevant part: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.” Id. 
 44 Id. art. 8. Article 8 of the Convention provides in relevant part: “Everyone has the right to re-
spect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” Id. 
 45 Id. art. 14. Article 14 of the Convention provides in relevant part: “The enjoyment of the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground . . . .” 
Id. 
 46 O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 185–86. Article 2 of Protocol 1 highlights every person’s 
right to an education. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Protocol art. 2, adopted Mar. 20, 1951, E.T.S. No. 9 (entered into force May 2, 1968). 
 47 See id. 
 48 O’Keeffe v. Ireland, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 185–86. Article 42 of the Constitution also pro-
vides in relevant part: “The State acknowledges that the primary and natural educator of the child is 
the Family and guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, according to 
their means, for the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their children.” 
Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 42(1). 
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vigilantly monitor and cure possible ill treatment of children.49 O’Keefe argued 
that publication of the Carrigan and Ryan Reports should have alerted the State 
that the national schools presented a risk of child abuse and prompted them to 
implement systems to safeguard children.50 Second, she asserted that, as an 
advanced democracy, Ireland was obligated to provide public education.51 
Moreover, even if Ireland were to fulfill this obligation via private entities, the 
national school system still should have incorporated regulations that better 
protected children.52 Finally, O’Keeffe argued that the State could not rid itself 
of liability by claiming that she could have sought her education outside of the 
national school system as she did not have sufficient resources to do so.53 
The State, on the other hand, agreed with the Supreme Court’s decision.54 
It asserted that the development and structure of the Irish primary education 
system, and thus, Dunderrow National School, was overseen and managed  by 
the Catholic Church.55 This unique structure, which evinced the will of the 
Irish populace, reflected the complete grant of control and management of 
schools to the denominations.56 Furthermore, the State refuted O’Keeffe’s ar-
gument that the State should be required to run the primary education system, 
stating that the ideology behind this obligation was not a consistent principle 
held by all states.57 The State also asserted that they were not liable for the 
failure to protect children from child abuse under Article 3 because Article 2 of 
Protocol 1 only guarantees that no student is precluded from receiving an edu-
cation.58 Pursuant to this argument, liability would be limited to  the State’s 
operational obligation of student protection.59 Finally, the State argued that in 
1973 there was an absence of evidence establishing that they had or should 
                                                                                                                           
 49 O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 186. O’Keeffe claimed that the State created neither primary 
nor secondary legislation to prevent the sexual abuse of children. Id. at 187. Although the State 
claimed it had established regulations, such as the 1965 Rules, O’Keeffe  alleged that such regulations 
were not primary or secondary legislation, had an unclear legal basis, were vague in applicability, and 
unavailable to the public. Id. Moreover, the State lacked an effective decision and complaints proce-
dure and, as a result, was not notified of complaints of abuse. Id. at 186–87. 
 50 Id. at 186. The Carrigan Report in 1931 proposed a variety of social and legislative reforms for 
the State to target sexual crimes against minors. Id. at 178. Furthermore, the Ryan Report revealed that 
industrial schools faced “widespread, chronic and severe” acts of physical and sexual abuse of chil-
dren largely at the hands of clergy members. Id. at 180. Moreover, the State unmistakably had a duty 
to guarantee children received proper care, but the Department of Education and Skill did not suffi-
ciently provide such care, as shown by the under reported abuse. Id. at 181. 
 51 See id. at 186. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 188. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
34 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review  [Vol. 40:E. Supp. 
have had knowledge of the risk L.H. would abuse O’Keeffe or, more generally, 
that any teacher would abuse a student.60 
B. The Court’s Findings 
On January 20, 2014, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR found for 
O’Keeffe, noting that the State had an obligation to protect children from ill 
treatment, even in the national school system.61 As a result, the court conclud-
ed that the State had violated Article 3 of the Convention.62 In evaluating the 
claims, the court noted that because the case took place in 1973, they would 
assess the State’s alleged responsibility from the point of view of the facts and 
standards of 1973.63 
First, the court found that the State had a positive obligation to protect 
children from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.64 The court rec-
ognized that the affirmative duty to ensure that children were not subject to 
such ill treatment should not be interpreted to place an excessive burden on the 
State, given the uncertainty of human nature.65 The court, relying on X & Y v. 
Netherlands and additional recent cases, noted that the State should at a mini-
mum provide “effective protection” and implement “reasonable steps” to pre-
vent ill treatment of children and vulnerable people that authorities knew or 
should have known about.66  
In addition, the court held that the State’s positive obligation to protect 
students was especially prevalent given the primary education nature of the 
case.67 Even in 1973, prior case law had already established that a positive ob-
ligation—in this case related to the right to education—could be imposed on 
the State by the Convention.68 The court rejected the State’s claim that its lia-
bility was absolved simply because O’Keeffe elected to attend Dunderrow Na-
                                                                                                                           
 60 Id. The State claimed there was insufficient evidentiary support to suggest there was an actual 
complaint received alleging L.H.’s abuse. Id. at 189. 
 61 Id. at 199. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See id. The court noted that in examining such viewpoints, it would not take into consideration 
current recognition and understanding of the risk of sexual abuse of children in schools. Id. at 191. 
 64 Id. at 192. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. (citing X & Y v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶¶ 21–27 (1985)). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 193. The court relied on Marckx v. Belgium, a case previously cited to create a positive 
obligation guaranteeing a child’s integration into a family under Article 8. See id.; Marckx v. Bel-
gium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 31 (1979). The court also relied on X & Y, where it held that the 
State had not fulfilled its Article 8 positive obligation to protect mentally handicapped adolescents 
because of the State’s failure to enact laws punishing sexual advances towards them. O’Keeffe, 2014-I 
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 193; see X & Y, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 21–27. There, the court found that the State 
should have known of the risk to mentally handicapped teens and should have prevented the harm 
through effective legislation. O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 193; see X & Y, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R., 
¶¶ 21–27. 
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tional School.69 The court reasoned that O’Keeffe, as well as other students, 
did not have a “realistic and acceptable alternative” to attending a local nation-
al school.70 The court also reasoned that the State could not avoid liability by 
delegating duties to private entities because it still had a duty to provide “suffi-
cient mechanisms of child protection.”71 
Second, the court found that the State had not adequately safeguarded 
O’Keeffe from sexual assault while a Dunderrow student, failing in their Arti-
cle 3 duty to provide her protection.72 Although the court recognized that Ire-
land’s unique education system placed national schools outside of state control, 
the court rejected the State’s claim that its liability was absolved as a result of 
that lack of control.73 The court stated that even under this managerial system, 
the State’s enforcement of criminal laws on sexual crime against minors sug-
gested the State’s knowledge of ill treatment of children.74 The court also 
found that the State’s duty to protect children from ill treatment was so inher-
ent, the State should have known that a lack of protective measures could 
compromise the safety of students.75 The court criticized the State for the lack 
of procedures and measures within the educational context and suggested that 
the State that could have, at the very least, prevented or addressed ill treatment 
through a detection or reporting system.76 Legislation at the time did not pro-
cedurally make it possible for concerned parents to file claims directly to State 
authority, and legislation only made it an obligation for inspectors to oversee 
the performance of teachers and students.77 
                                                                                                                           
 69 O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 194. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 199–200. 
 73 See id. at 196–97. 
 74 Id. at 197. The court noted that in 1935, Ireland specifically criminalized the sexual abuse of 
minors and that statistical evidence provided in the Carrigan Report found an alarming amount of 
sexual crime in Ireland. Id. at 196–97. The Carrigan Committee had recommended legislative changes 
and more severe criminal punishment on such sexual offenses, which lead to the adoption of the 1935 
Act. Id. The 1935 Act created further criminalized sexual offences against young girls. Id. at 197. 
Moreover, the Ryan Report also showed a high number of complaints made to the State regarding 
sexual offenses against young children. Id. 
 75 Id. at 197. 
 76 See id. The court rejected the State’s claim that the 1965 Rules for National Schools (1965 
Rules) provided an appropriate reporting mechanism. Id. On the contrary, the court found that the 
1965 Rules failed to outline any requirement that a state authority supervise the treatment of children 
in national schools, and did not provide a method for children or parents to go directly to a state au-
thority with complaints. Id. Instead, complaints against teachers were directed to a non-state denomi-
national manager, therefore dissuading parents from filing complaints directly to a state authority. See 
id. at 197–98. 
 77 Id. at 198. 
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C. The Dissent 
The dissenting opinion in O’Keeffe raised concerns regarding the out-
come of the judgment.78 First, the dissent disagreed on the issue of the timeli-
ness of complaints, finding that there was not sufficient evidence to prove that 
parents would have complained more vigorously had regulations encouraged 
them to do so.79 Second, the dissent disagreed with the majority regarding the 
extent of the State’s positive obligations, finding that the court incorrectly ap-
plied a retrospective interpretation of Article 3 and extended the scope of the 
obligation in such a way that future interpretation is not predictable.80 
III. ANALYSIS 
O’Keeffe v. Ireland is not the only recent case that finds that Article 3 im-
poses a positive obligation on States to enact measures to ensure that individu-
als within their jurisdiction, especially young children, are not subjected to ill 
treatment.81 For example, in September 1998, the ECtHR found that the United 
Kingdom had violated Article 3 of the Convention by failing to adequately 
protect the applicant from child abuse from his stepfather.82 There, the court 
reasoned that the United Kingdom’s corporal punishment law permitting “rea-
sonable and moderate physical punishment of the child” failed to protect the 
applicant when his stepfather beat him with a cane.83 In addition, in May 2001, 
the ECtHR held that the United Kingdom had failed to protect children from ill 
treatment at home when the local authority failed to remove the abused chil-
dren from their home.84 These recent cases illustrate a modern trend towards 
imposing a positive obligation on states to take reasonable measures to protect 
and prevent children from ill treatment where state officials had constructive 
knowledge of the abuse.85 However, these cases only raise questions concern-
                                                                                                                           
 78 See id. at 214 (Zupancic, Gyulumyan, Kalaydjieva, De Gaetano, Wojtyczek, JJ., dissenting). 
 79 See id. 
 80 See id. at 214–15. The dissent suggested that the majority inaccurately interpreted the obliga-
tion of the State to prevent the risk of ill treatment in the education context by incorrectly merging the 
Article 3 duties with the implicit duty to assess “the risk of ill-treatment in the context of education” 
under Article 2 of Protocol 1. Id. at 216. The dissent feared the majority’s broad interpretation would 
expand the duties under the Convention and risk unpredictable interpretations of the State’s obliga-
tions. Id.  
 81 See Z v. United Kingdom, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 4; A. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
25599/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611, 624 (1998). 
 82 A., 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 623–24. 
 83 Id. at 614, 623–24. 
 84 Z, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 25. 
 85 James Gallen, O’Keeffe v. Ireland: The Liability of States for Failure to Provide an Effective 
System for the Detection and Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse in Education, 78 MOD. L. REV. 151, 
158–59 (2015) (stating that additional cases regarding Article 3 affirm the extension of Article 3 obli-
gations); see Z, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 25; A., 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 623–24. 
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ing states’ responsibility to prevent physical abuse, while leaving unanswered 
questions regarding cases of psychological ill treatment.86 
A. Recent Impacts of the O’Keeffe Judgment 
In response to the O’Keeffe judgment, the State must provide the Council 
of Europe with an action plan every six months, highlighting individual and 
general measures taken to protect students from abuse.87 Most recently, in July 
2016, the State submitted an action plan stating that the State had made press 
statements and covered the judgment in national media, made payment to ap-
plicant, and made additional general developments to further protect children 
from ill treatment in national schools.88 Moreover, on November 19, 2015, the 
Children First Act (Children First) was enacted “for the purposes of making 
further and better provision for the care and protection of children.”89 Children 
First creates legal obligations on service providers such as schools and hospi-
tals by requiring a designated individual be responsible for overseeing child 
protection concerns and reporting suspicions of child abuse.90 
Despite the State’s recent attempts at enacting legislation as a result of the 
O’Keeffe judgment, the proposed action plans and Children First have yet to be 
fully implemented.91 Certain sections of the Children First Act have been im-
plemented in the past two years, and the Minister is likely to continue phasing 
in the remainder of the Act; however, until they have been signed into law, 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Gallen, supra note 85, at 160 (arguing that further clarification is necessary to determine 
whether there are implications for protection beyond physical ill treatment); see Z, 2001-V Eur. Ct. 
H.R. at 25; A., 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 623–24. 
 87 “Children Cannot Wait Any Longer”—On Anniversary of O’Keefe v. Ireland ISPCC Calls for 
Commencement of Children First Act, ISPCC (July 29, 2016), http://www.ispcc.ie/news-media/news/
children-cannot-wait-any-longer-on-anniversary-of-okeefe-v-ireland-ispcc-calls-for-commencement-
of-children-first-act/14806 [https://perma.cc/DX97-3VDZ] [hereinafter Children Cannot Wait Any 
Longer]; see Press Release, Dep’t of Educ. & Skills, Ireland, Draft Action Plan in Response to Louise 
O’Keeffe Case Published (Aug. 1, 2014), www.education.ie/en/Press-Events/Press-Releases/2014-
Press-Releases/PR14-08-01.html [https://perma.cc/9TND-NQWT]. 
 88 GOV’T OF IR., ACTION PLAN: O’KEEFFE V. IRELAND (2016), https://www.education.ie/en/
Learners/Information/Former-Residents-of-Industrial-Schools/Action-Plan-July-2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KFH6-VZ57]. The submitted Action Plan claims that (1) Ireland had been advancing chang-
es in its child protection measures through phases in 1991/1992, 2001/2004, and again in 2011, (2) 
that a sub-committee within the Inter-Departmental Implementation Group on Children First is cur-
rently evaluating whether problems with child protection identified in the judgment have been appro-
priately remedied since, and (3) the State Claims Agency has completed an assessment of relevant 
litigation involving school abuse to identify cases that fall within the judgment’s scope. Id. ¶¶ 4–13, 
17. 
 89 Children First Act 2015, at 5 (Act No. 36/2015) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/
act/36/enacted/en/index.html [https://perma.cc/7XDF-6J9G]; see also Children Cannot Wait Any 
Longer, supra note 87 (describing the implementation of the Children First Act). 
 90 See Children First Act 2015 at 5; Children Cannot Wait Any Longer, supra note 87. 
 91 Children Cannot Wait Any Longer, supra note 87; Children First Act 2015, TUSLA, http://
www.tusla.ie/children-first/children-first-act-2015/ [https://perma.cc/L83N-B857]. 
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Irish children may not have sufficient legal protection.92 The lack of urgency in 
enacting legislation reflects the government’s hesitance to impose such re-
quirements immediately, likely due to the distinct history of Ireland’s public 
education system.93 Because the Irish public system is so heavily dependent on 
the Catholic Church’s management, the State likely fears imposing such duties 
on the Catholic Church due to possible pushback from the Catholic communi-
ty.94 The transition from a once self-regulated education system to a highly 
regulated one, thus, may still leave too many children unprotected in the im-
mediate future.95 
Although the government has received criticism regarding the timing of 
phasing in the entirety of Children First, the language of the act does reflect the 
State’s direct response to the O’Keeffe judgment.96 For instance, Section 14 of 
Children First requires that: 
[W]here a mandated person knows, believes or has reasonable 
grounds to suspect, on the basis of information that he or she has re-
ceived, acquired or becomes aware in the course of his or her em-
ployment or profession as such a mandated person, that a child— 
(a) has been harmed,  
(b) is being harmed, or  
(c) is at risk of being harmed,  
he or she shall as soon as practicable, report that knowledge, belief 
or suspicion, as the case may be, to the Agency.97 
The ECtHR’s judgment in O’Keeffe depended largely on the fact that the State 
had no legal framework that protected children in the education system, which 
led to the State’s failure to safeguard children from ill treatment.98 In response 
to the judgment, Section 14 broadens the scope of liability by requiring the 
reporting of child abuse where the mandated person not only has knowledge of 
past and present abuses, but also when the person believes the child is at risk 
                                                                                                                           
 92 Children Cannot Wait Any Longer, supra note 87. 
 93 See O’Keeffe v. Ireland, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 195–96 (noting the important role of reli-
gious communities in the Irish primary education system from the early nineteenth century); Children 
Cannot Wait Any Longer supra note 87 (emphasizing the delay in enacting the Children First Act in 
its entirety).  
 94 See O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 195 (noting that the parties generally agreed on the struc-
ture of the Irish education system). 
 95 See id. at 196 (stating that the Irish public school system has had a unique presence since the 
early 1920s and noting that the denominations had expressed a firm wish to retain their control). 
 96 See Children Cannot Wait Any Longer, supra note 87; see, e.g., Children First Act 2015, 
§ 14(1) (requiring mandated persons from reporting suspicions of child abuse). 
 97 Children First Act 2015, § 14(1). 
 98 See O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 198 (emphasizing the lack of an effective regulatory 
framework, which if in place could have prevented such ill treatment). 
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of abuse.99 As a result, if fully enacted, the broad scope of liability in Children 
First may lead to greater protection of children, especially in the educational 
context.100 
B. Future Uncertainty in Scope 
The ECtHR made clear in O’Keeffe that the State had “an inherent obliga-
tion . . . to ensure [the vulnerable children’s] protection from ill-treatment, es-
pecially in the primary-education context, through the adoption, as necessary, 
of special measures and safeguards.”101 However, the language of the majority 
opinion is interesting in that it imposes such an obligation, not as an inherent 
requirement of the Convention, but as an obligation stemming from the State’s 
role in public primary education.102 This novel approach creates uncertainty in 
the interpretation of inherent positive obligations rooted in articles outside of 
Article 3, and as mentioned in the dissent, may impose ideological visions on 
the best practices of public service.103 In considering the impacts of the judg-
ment, it is unclear whether the court will impose new positive obligations in 
future cases involving the duties of public servants.104 For instance, the court 
could extend its logic in O’Keeffe to create a positive obligation on the state to 
guarantee the freedom of religion under Article 9.105  
The ECtHR’s judgment may also be interpreted narrowly to impose posi-
tive obligations only in the educational context.106 The language of the judg-
ment expressly states that positive obligations under Article 3 are inherent in 
the nature of government tasks, “especially in a primary-education context.”107 
As a result, the court may, in future cases, interpret O’Keeffe narrowly in the 
educational context, rather than broadly stretching vicarious liability to situa-
tions outside of education.108 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Children First Act 2015, § 14 (mandating persons to report child abuse). 
 100 See id.; O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 198 (finding a failure to place an obligation to in-
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 101 O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 192–93. 
 102 See id.; Renata Uitz, Guest Post on Grand Chamber Judgment in O’Keeffe v. Ireland: 
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 104 See Uitz, supra note 102. 
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H.R. at 214–15 (Zupancic, Gyulumyan, Kalaydjieva, De Gaetano, Wojtyczek, JJ., dissenting). 
 106 See O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 192; Gallen, supra note 85, at 160. 
 107 O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 192–93. 
 108 See id. at 199 (highlighting the importance of such an obligation in the primary education 
context); Gallen, supra note 85, at 160. 
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Finally, the court was unclear whether the State’s liability under Article 3 
is limited only to physical abuse.109 For instance, whether Article 3 of the Con-
vention protects children in Ireland facing discrimination that results in grave 
emotional and psychological harm, but not physical ill treatment, is an unset-
tled issue.110 With the rise of bullying awareness in the educational context, the 
decision may have implications for broadening the scope of liability by pro-
tecting students from discrimination or bullying in schools.111 
CONCLUSION 
In O’Keeffe v. Ireland, the court found that Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights created a positive obligation on states to protect 
children from ill treatment, including sexual assault. Moreover, even if Ire-
land’s unique public school system deferred managerial responsibilities to the 
Catholic Church, this did not absolve the State from liability. Although the 
outcome of the judgment was favorable for O’Keeffe and other victims of sex-
ual abuse, the implications of the judgment are still unclear. The recent rise in 
awareness of psychological and emotional abuse in the educational context 
may influence the court to broaden the scope of liability in the same way that 
growing research on sexual abuse affected the O’Keeffe judgment. For exam-
ple, in future cases the government may be liable for psychological ill treat-
ment. Despite the likelihood of increased protection for students in Ireland, the 
government may continue to be liable only for positive obligations inherent in 
the primary education context. 
                                                                                                                           
 109 See O’Keeffe, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 199 (mentioning an obligation and violation only in the 
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 110 Gallen, supra note 85, at 160. 
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